REBALANCING THE MILITARY PROFESSION
It is impossible to have a broad grasp of history and of the better literature of the past and not see the blatant falsity, to say nothing of the shortsightedness, of defining today"s troublesome problems as unprecedented or exceptional. Good and bad men have been successfully and unsuccessfully wrestling with them for centuries. Our country deserves military leaders who are familiar with that territory. 1 -Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale, USN (Retired)
The United States Military is under attack and its enemy is not isolated to the battlefield. Multiple forces of disorder in the early 21st Century-the inability to deliver clear victories after more than nine years of persistent conflict against an enemy for which we were not prepared, an environment of information overload with multiple competing agendas that promote shallow thinking and short-term solutions, and an omniscient media that immediately highlights and often questions every action the Army"s failure in Vietnam was due to the inability of its officers to provide the leadership-enforcement of standards and unit cohesion-required for a combat army. 2 This failure was primarily the result of the Army being "permeated with a set of values, practices, and policies that forced considerations of career advancement to figure more heavily in the behavior of individual officers than the traditional ethics." 3 The authors contend this primacy of careerism over selfless service began during World War II when the military had to merge with both economic and social sources of U.S. power to confront the global challenge. 4 Practices of the modern business corporation-systems analysis, personnel management, and computer decision models-became the organizational model of the military, and the slow erosion of the professional ethos began. 5 In a follow-on book regarding this subject, else it does effectively does not matter. 6 He goes on to state the profession"s "structure is so deformed that it cannot produce officers-planners and leaders-who are well versed in the art of war." 7 The advent of the all-volunteer force has not helped this bureaucratic imbalance in which the system strongly favors careerism over selfless professionalism. Gabriel calls for the military to "relearn what it once knew; namely, that it is a true profession, and not just one more enterprise awash in the sea of a free society." In advance of this yearlong discussion, this paper contends it is time to recognize the military profession is out of balance and in many respects a "wicked problem."
Wicked problems are "ill-defined, ambiguous and associated with strong moral, political and professional issues." 13 As such, the military profession needs to be viewed through lenses that recognize both its enduring ideals as well as its context-dependent traits.
Both categories of traits determine whether the profession is better or worse off during a given period. Colonel Matthew Moten (USA), deputy head of the History Department at West Point, clarifies this position by stating that professions wax and wane over time, and that wartime often exposes weaknesses needing reform. 14 As a wicked problem, the military profession cannot go from worse to better via sporadic, shallow, and incremental solutions. Rather, the profession needs continuous senior leader engagement. The time is long overdue for implementing changes to foster a renaissance of professional ethos in order to ensure the sustained health of the profession.
Using the U.S. Army as the primary focus given the multitude of studies and reviews it has conducted over the past four decades, this paper believes the forthcoming 2011 study will produce many similarities to past results, conclusions, and recommendations. Past U.S. Army studies reveal a military profession out of balance; acting more like a bureaucracy-in which careerism, micro-management, and a zerodefect mentality dominate-than a profession that is competent, courageous, and selfless. This monograph begins by framing what it means to be a military professional.
Next, a review of the U.S. Army studies is conducted to establish what has brought the profession to its current bureaucracy-dominated condition. The paper then examines the profession in the context of the 21st Century. While volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA), the current environment is not unprecedented, but it has resulted in what can be characterized as the "Pecos River approach" in regards to the U.S.
Military"s response to the multitude of challenges. Soldier And The State, with the thesis, "the modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer is a professional man" defined by the characteristics of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. 16 In defining expertise, Huntington puts forth the dual requirement of officers to have both breadth and depth, stating these traits only come about through education and experience over a long period of time. 17 It is up to the institution to first ensure its officers begin their journey with a broad-based liberal education that imparts an awareness of the society and traditions for which he serves. 18 Secondly, the institution must develop the officers with a depth of skill and knowledge to ensure the successful application of violence, which is the primary function and "peculiar skill of the officer." 19 The characteristic of responsibility is based upon the fact that the expertise of the profession is essential for the security, functioning, and wellbeing of the society that created it. 20 Furthermore, Huntington goes on to state the society that created the profession demands "the management of violence be utilized only for socially approved purposes." 21 Huntington"s final characteristic is corporateness, which is the notion of unity and consciousness that separate the profession from the society it serves; manifested through the establishment of standards and enforcement of professional responsibility. 22 It is through corporateness that the hierarchical bureaucracy of the profession and organization is established; meaning increased levels of competence and responsibility are defined by promotion to progressively senior ranks. 23 Finally, Huntington believed the military officer should stay out of the political process because it was beyond the realm of military competence. 24 As such, the military profession is subordinate to civilian control of the state, responsible for three primary functions: 1) to advise what is necessary for the minimum military security of the state, 2) to provide the military point of view on the implications of alternative courses of state action, and 3) to implement state decisions with respect to military security, including those which counter provided military judgment. 25 While Huntington does acknowledge the pressures of the political process on the military profession, the value of his work resides in defining the enduring ideals of the profession.
In order to get a sense of the context-dependent pressures on the profession, it is Morris Janowitz" book, The Professional Soldier, which does a more complete job of identifying the modern pressures the military profession faces. Originally published in 1960, Janowitz" book reads like a current-day professional journal article when he states in the preface: "The military face a crisis as a profession: How can it organize itself to meet its multiple functions of strategic deterrence, limited warfare, and enlarged politicomilitary responsibility?" 26 The rise of technology, ultimately manifested in the threat of total war via the nuclear weapon, signaled the beginning of the end of the mass army and a convergence of military and civilian organizations in the U.S. government to handle security issues. 27 Janowitz also contended the movement away from a system of conscription was the end of the mass army, resulting in "smaller, fully professional, and more fully alerted and self-contained military force…a military force "in being."" 28 Unlike
Huntington, Janowitz believed the military profession needed to be engaged in the political process "to assist in accurately estimating the consequences of the threat or use of force against the potentials for persuasion and conflict resolution." 29 Since the end of Vietnam, the U.S. Army has conducted no less than eight major studies of military professionalism, education, and leader development. As a group, they share the common themes of examining the current health of the military profession and assessing the training and development of officers to ensure competent leadership to meet future security challenges. 31 Three of the studies will be examined in detail to support the thesis. These studies highlight the commonality of issues and problems over the better part of four decades, thus supporting the call for wholesale changes in how the profession operates. Two hundred and fifty officers participated in the study and the results were significant to say the least. In terms of the ideal professional standards, respondents defined them as a climate of "individual integrity, mutual trust and confidence, unselfish motivation, technical competence, and an unconstrained flow of information." 35 In sharp contrast to the ideal standards, respondents summarized the actual professional standards as:
Selfish behavior that places personal success ahead of the good of the Service; looking upward to please superiors instead of looking downward to fulfill the legitimate needs of subordinates; preoccupation with the attainment of trivial short-term objectives even through dishonest practices that injure the long-term fabric of the organization; incomplete communication between junior and seniors which leave the senior uninformed and the junior feeling unimportant; and inadequate technical or managerial competence to perform effectively the assigned duties. 36 As for those differences in the professional culture deemed to be the most significant, the top five were: 1) completing efficiency reports; 2) delegating authority; 3) setting a good example; 4) being loyal to subordinates; and 5) looking out for welfare of subordinates. 37 The five most significant causes for these differences were identified as well, they were: 1) inadequate counseling/setting standards by seniors; 2) unrealistic goals/quotas; 3) no time/excuse for failure; 4) loyalty up-not down; and 5) pressure to remain competitive (survival). 38 To close out the survey, study participants identified the top five solution themes necessary to bring the differences into alignment. The themes were: 1) emphasis/attention on part of senior officers; 2) the reward system-OER, promotion, assignments, schools, retention, awards and decorations; 3) communication (interpersonal); 4) stabilize personnel policies and assignments; and 5) utilize varying degrees of talent-allow for specialization and retention of solid non-promotable officers.
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Despite the concept of the wicked problem not being formally defined until 1973, the "Study on Military Professionalism" clearly acknowledged the profession as such due to its social complexity with man at the center "as an individual, a member of a number of groups and sub-groups, and a product of his culture". 40 The Vietnam War put tremendous pressure on the Army, leaving it far worse off than when it began the war and resulting in the "hollow" Army of the 1970s. The study provided Army leadership with a comprehensive solution set to bring the culture back into alignment with the ideal values of the profession. The recommendations were: 1) share the findings of the study with the Officer Corps; 2) promote an atmosphere of honest communication amongst junior and senior officers; 3) motivate competent officers and eliminate marginal officers; 4) ensure senior officers set the example and enforce the standards; 5) focus on developing measurable expertise; 6) revise officer assignment and priorities-duration of assignments and essentiality of command tours; 7) revise the evaluation system; 8)
revise career patterns; and 9) revise promotion policies. 41 Unfortunately, actual implementation of these recommendations was incremental at best. While the study did result in more centralization of the officer personnel management system, Gen
Westmoreland chose not to release the results of the study to the Army Officer Corps; it was finally released two years later and any real changes that could have been realized with a timely release were gone. interviews-that Army practices were out of balance with Army beliefs. 44 Among the many findings, the ATLDP identified an erosion of cohesion and trust due to the Army not meeting officer expectations in regards to leadership development opportunities, micro-management was pervasive, and there was diminishing direct contact between seniors and subordinates. 45 This was very disturbing news in regards to the health of the Army culture. ATLDP findings clearly indicated an Army culture out of balance in terms of what it believes and how it actually acts; a divergence in its espoused theories of action vice theories-in-use. 46 The intervening nine years of continuous combat have not helped this imbalance. It is not a stretch to state that, given the pressure to produce measures of success and effectiveness in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the mistrust in leadership has been exacerbated due to "the leader"s desire to be invulnerable to criticism." 47 One can understand having a zero-defect mentality on critical, lives-in-thebalance issues, but to have the same criteria for everything not only erodes cohesion and trust, but misses a significant development opportunity of subordinate leaders as were the aspects of the current culture preventing this from taking place. 50 Pierce"s hypotheses, there was sufficient support in the results indicating the Army"s current culture is not congruent with the goal of producing mentally agile and adaptive leaders.
With the combination of a Market -Hierarchy culture, the results showed the current Army culture was not supportive of the professional development of its future leaders. Rather, these findings support the anecdotal feedback regarding the bureaucratic imbalance found in the ATLDP results. 62 Secondly, the results demonstrate the preferred Army culture gravitated more significantly towards a Clan -Adhocracy, indicating the desire for a profession that is focused on the development of its members and "characterized by flexibility and discretion…the hallmarks of professionalism." 63 Finally, the MSAI results supported the OCAI profile by being predominantly in the Clan quadrant. 64 The three main managerial skills of the Clan-style culture are: Managing the Development of Others, Managing Interpersonal Relationships, and Managing Teams. 65 As a result, Dr. Pierce concluded the Army needs "to bring its professional culture and particularly the informal professional development program into congruency and pointed in the direction that favors flexibility, discretion, and innovation." In reference to Admiral Stockdale"s opening quote, it is wrong to say the complexity of the current security environment is unprecedented. Doing so diminishes the significant security challenges of the past, is also self-defeating, negates faith in our ability to competently confront the challenges, and cedes the initiative to our adversaries. The most significant challenge the current VUCA environment presents is the ever-increasing rate of information flow that has overwhelmed the military. The military is overwhelmed because it continues to operate under a bureaucratic, closed labor system that has not significantly changed in a quarter of a century; the last significant change being the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 that addressed increased joint integration amongst the four services. 67 A military profession that does not take the initiative to modify its organizational structure and capabilities, or adapt its strategic, operational, and tactical focus based on the current and future threat, is assuming significant risk.
If there is one agreed upon theme regarding the current and future security environment, it is that adversaries will continue to seek ways to overcome, neutralize, or defeat the U.S. Military"s conventional and technological superiority. Whether it is labeled Hybrid Warfare, War Amongst the People, or Fourth Generation Warfare, it is clear "the wide distribution and asymmetric nature of new threats makes it harder to focus attention and resources." 68 A second prevalent theme is that by virtue of budget allocation and the abundant resources it possesses (in comparison with the other instruments of power), the U.S. Military is going to continue to be called upon to conduct operations outside of its comfort zone. This is most recently highlighted by stabilization and reconstruction efforts and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 69 As a result, commanders and officers at all levels "will have to be able to react quickly to enemies who will adapt and constantly probe weaknesses with an increased level of sophistication." 70 Furthermore, current adversaries are more adept than the U.S. Military in winning the battle of the narrative in the current environment. The global spread of information technology allows for the near real-time flow of information, resulting in an environment of whomever puts the story out first gains the advantage, regardless of whether the report is factual or distorted, the audience"s initial perception often rules the day. 71 Unfortunately, the bureaucratic dominance of the military over the past several decades left the profession ill-prepared to meet these challenges.
The bureaucratic dominance of the U.S. Military since the Vietnam era resulted in a shallow understanding of the true nature of the threats and challenges of the 21st
Century. The system continues to favor action over intellectual merit, where command is the dominant factor to continued promotion. 72 Thus, rather than taking the time to apply intellectual rigor in the aftermath of Vietnam, the U.S. Military returned to focusing on the conventional war-fighting skills required to confront the Soviet threat and the counterinsurgency lessons identified in Southeast Asia were lost. 73 Additionally, the lingering success of Desert Storm overshadowed any of the lessons the U.S. Military could have learned from intervention efforts in Somalia and the Balkans. 74 The system did little to reward the creativity, courage, and vision to see the developing threat.
Rather, it rewarded officers who conformed to the system and followed established careers paths that allow them to rise to senior levels without realistic assessments of strategic competence. 75 Herein resides the wicked problem of the military profession. Because of bureaucratic dominance, a personnel system that rewards action first and foremost, and an overabundance of resources when compared to the rest of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Military takes a "Pecos River approach" to the myriad of issues it has to solve. The "Pecos River approach" means that by attempting to respond to everything, solutions produced are "a mile wide and an inch deep." 76 Clear examples of the "Pecos River approach" are the expansive joint education requirements and curriculums packed into single academic years at the staff and war colleges, the "check the box" assignment policies, and once again conducting contingency operations with a rotation policy that causes the U.S. Military to fight its extended wars one year at a time. 77 The "Pecos
River approach" results in a significant lack of institutional memory when engaged in protracted wars and produces an officer corps proficient in the mechanisms of the bureaucracy, but lacking in the mastery of the operational art of war. 78 Without reform, the military is ill-equipped to deal with both the current and future security environment.
The VUCA security environment requires a rebalancing of the U.S. Military away from the bureaucratic dominance and towards a rebirthing of the professional ethos. In order to do this, the officer corps needs to go deep before it can utilize the breadth required for the 21st Century security environment.
Rebalancing the Profession
Now that a case has been made that the U.S. Military has evolved into being dominated by bureaucratic activities to the detriment of the profession, what can be done to correct the situation? Fortunately, there are many relevant and applicable proposals regarding a rebalancing. The most significant are: the call for Congress to mandate 360-degree evaluations for field-grade and flag officers; broadening academic curriculums and increasing the opportunity for outside experiences at precommissioning schools; expanding the opportunity for career broadening assignments throughout an officer"s career-sabbaticals for advanced academic degrees, exchange programs in interagency and multi-national organizations, and instructing at Service academies, ROTC programs, and professional military education schools; demanding all officers learn a foreign language; ensuring promotion boards screen for intellectual achievements-advanced degrees in non-military fields, publishing articles in professional journals, and other records of professional research; extending initial retirement eligibility well-beyond the current 20 year mark; and prolonging assignments to ensure expertise is truly gained before moving onto the next level. 79 While all of these recommendations are valid and merit consideration for implementation, they require formal changes to bureaucratic processes. Given the U.S. Military"s past history of resistance to change, bureaucratic inertia, and an austere budget environment, it is difficult to foresee any of them being implemented in the near future.
Rather, a change in professional mindset that focuses on the peculiar skills of the military officer is required now. This change is realized through two primary methods that are semi-formal at best. Neither of them requires increased spending or formal changes to the system. First, the time is long overdue to re-invigorate a professionwide, self-development program focusing on the study of military history. Second, senior leadership needs to establish a professional military society modeled after the approach taken by Gerhard von Scharnhorst when he established the Prussian Militärische Gesellschaft in Berlin in 1801.
Individual Self-Development
One of the most prevalent themes of the day is the call for a forward-thinking military with a breadth of knowledge that expands beyond traditional military skill sets; capable of confronting wicked problems and achieving success. 80 Unfortunately, much of today"s so-called forward thinking is disconnected from the past. 81 As previously stated, today"s military is "too consumed by immediate pressures to examine the past in a serious and critical way. to his schedule each day, with the belief that if subordinates saw the boss dedicating the time, they would follow suit. 92 He also purchased more than 6,000 books for unit libraries throughout the division and required the division"s regiments and battalions to conduct reading programs and hold regular discussions on selected books. 93 For the individual officer, LtGen Van Riper felt a structured program based upon one"s grade and experience was essential:
Lieutenants and captains should be more concerned about the tactical and technical aspects in their studies of history while colonels should be concerned about the operational, strategical, and theoretical issues. Majors and lieutenant colonels are transitioning in their concerns, thus they have interests in both areas. 94 It was LtGen Van Riper"s firm belief that "Marines fight better when they fight smarter, and a systematic and progressive professional reading program contributes directly to that end." 95 Unfortunately, LtGen Van Riper"s enthusiasm for life-long learning has yet to truly permeate the modern day military profession.
There are no shortages of commander"s professional reading lists available these days. 96 The problem is with a lack of follow through by the very commanders who publish the lists. Unlike LtGen Van Riper, there is very little push by senior commanders to encourage the reading of the listed books. Perhaps there is an expectation that all officers are sufficiently self-motivated to do so? However, without sincere involvementcall it pressure-from above to motivate the lower levels of the officer corps, these professional development programs fail to live up to their potential for re-balancing and re-invigorating the profession"s intellectual vigor and service ethic. the Forum needs to bring both focus and more exposure to the myriad of professional essay contests currently being conducted. 108 As an example, the Secretary of Defense sponsors an annual essay competition only for those enrolled in professional military education (PME) programs. 109 Contestants "write on any aspect of U.S. Government national security strategy-addressing the coherent employment of the political, military, economic, and informational instruments of national power to achieve strategic objectives." 110 The Forum could bring better focus and exposure to this competition by proposing the relevant security questions of the day that need to be answered and then open it up to all officers given formal PME programs comprise only a small portion of an officer"s career. This increased exposure to the relevant questions of the day would bring the potential for more creative and critical thought in the responses.
Establishing the Forum is executable in the short-term because its semi-formal nature does not require any adjustments to force management systems. There are four main benefits. First, the professional knowledge base of the officer corps at all levelstactical, operational, and strategic-is deepened through recurring self-study and via robust participation in the essay competitions. Second, professional ethos and service ethic are reaffirmed through the recurring dialogue sessions that pull officers out of the daily bureaucratic grind. Third, the open debate, the objective criticism, and the challenging of ideas through Forum interactions would overcome Scharnhorst"s belief of one-sidedness found in private study. 111 This would develop the Bildung of the individual officer and enhance the overall intellectual agility and adaptability of the U.S. Military, thus ensuring it is better enabled to successfully meet the broad challenges of the 21st
Century security environment. Finally, the Forum has the great potential to become the change mechanism for formally cleaning up the bureaucratic sclerosis that has plagued the profession for more than four decades.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to demonstrate that the U.S. Military is out of balance. That it has acted more like a bureaucracy than a profession for over four decades. This thesis was supported through a review of literature by Huntington and Janowitz to baseline those traits of the military profession that are enduring and those that are contextual. Through a survey of past U.S. Army studies of the profession, this paper revealed the U.S. Military is indeed behaving like a bureaucracy-in which careerism, micro-management, and a zero-defect mentality dominate-rather than a profession that is competent, courageous, and selfless. However, Dr. Pierce"s study revealed an officer corps that desires a rebirth of a professional ethos focused on forward thinking and the development of subordinates. This paper concluded by proposing two significant reforms to rebalance the U.S. Military: formalizing a career-
